For decades, the United States wielded an unusual edge over our geopolitical rivals: many countries genuinely wanted to be our friends. Days away from a historic presidential transition, America is about to upend that competitive advantage. And all for an island with a population of 57,000.
Incoming President Donald Trump wants to annex Greenland. The locals, of course, are largely opposed. And Denmark—which owns the island—isn’t looking to sell.
It’s worth recalling that the Danes are US allies and fellow members of NATO. That alliance, like many of Washington’s international partnerships, is a hot commodity rooted in mutual interest and consent. But if Trump actually manages to cajole an allied government into ceding its territory to us, the value of a red, white, and blue friendship is going to take a very big hit.
No Laughing Matter
A decade ago, “Donald Trump tries to buy Greenland” might have sounded like the punchline to some light-hearted partisan ribbing. But during his first presidency, Trump actually directed officials in his administration to investigate a purchase. Danes and Greenlanders both rebuffed him.
Emboldened by his November election victory and backed by a Republican trifecta in Washington, Trump is making another pass at the territory.
Even if the United States never seizes Greenland, the damage may already be done. In recent years, Greenlanders have been renegotiating their ties with Copenhagen. Many, including the island’s prime minister Múte Bourup Egede, favor independence. Absent Trump’s meddling, Danes and Greenlanders might well have come to an amicable divorce.
But the prospect of American annexation could tip the scales in those negotiations. Consider how Americans might respond if Denmark were to suddenly become third wheel in deliberations over the status of Puerto Rico. And yet, here we are.
Friends: What Are They Good For?
Denmark is an American ally. If nothing else, don’t we owe better treatment to our friends?
Alliances yield benefits for both Americans and allies alike. They allow smaller nations to retain their independence while benefiting from large-country largess. Denmark would likely be unable to fend off a Russian attack by itself. Thanks to its NATO membership, Denmark doesn’t have to—it falls under the American security umbrella. And because of NATO, the United States is not alone in the world either. After 9/11, Danish troops fought and died in Afghanistan just as Americans did.
There’s still more for Americans to gain from our alliances. The empires of old were as expensive as they were expansive, requiring rule by brute force. Yet ours is an “empire of bases,” with outposts hosted by our allies. America doesn’t need to control Greenland—we have had a major base there since World War II. And our allies are open for business—American companies operate freely in Greenland as they do around the world.
Without territorial annexation, the United States can still maintain a global footprint that is both unprecedented in scale and efficiency. While we boast a greater reach than any historical empire, our defense spending continues to decline relative to GDP.
That would be a much harder square to circle if our company was unwanted. But America is popular with our allies, especially in Europe and East Asia. That goodwill can’t be taken for granted, of course. Several European leaders have spoken out publicly against Trump’s Greenlandic fixation. Privately, they may be wondering about what would happen if the American troops based on their soil turn against them.
A Case Study in Ally Abuse
A dose of the obvious: Attacking your friends is a surefire way to lose your friends. More than just being common sense, we’ve actually seen this dynamic play out in recent years in the case of Russia and Ukraine.
Pre-invasion Ukraine was not quite a Russian ally in the sense that Denmark is an American one. In the year after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the two countries seesawed in and out of episodes of tension. Still—difficult as it is to imagine today—Kyiv and the Kremlin also experienced periods of fairly close partnership. Ukraine hosted Moscow’s most important military installation outside of the Russian Federation, the Black Sea Fleet’s Sevastopol base. Most Ukrainians once opposed joining NATO and even viewed Russia in a positive light.
Then came 2014. Russia seized Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea by force. It invaded the east of the country. Eight years later, the Russians launched a full-scale assault. Russia is understandably hated in Ukraine. Use of the Russian language is steadily eroding. Even if the Russians were to raise the white flag tomorrow, they might not recoup their standing with Ukrainians for generations, if ever.
And the shockwaves are reverberating beyond Ukraine. Among Russia’s nominal allies—mostly other ex-Soviet republics—reception for Moscow’s war of conquest in Eastern Europe has been mixed at best. Belarus is the only Russian associate that really supports the invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the others, from Kazakhstan to Armenia, are looking to diversify their friend groups. Deep economic and geographic ties prevent a clean break with Russia in most cases. Still, no one seems to view the Kremlin as a sustainable investment.
The True Cost of the Greenland Gambit
What does this all mean for America?
On the one hand, Trump taking Greenland won’t prompt NATO to fold overnight just as invading Ukraine hasn’t left Russia completely isolated. But it could do long-term damage to our standing in Denmark and, by proxy, other European partners, who are bound to start looking for other options. It will generate uneasiness about the presence of US troops on allied territory (remember, Greenland hosts an American base just as Ukraine hosted the Russian Black Sea Fleet). More worryingly, it will send a message to potential allies that the United States really is no better than Russia and China.
In the 1990s, Central European nations lobbied hard to get the Clinton administration to support their entry into NATO. Just a generation before, Red Army troops had brutalized Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in order to impose Soviet “friendship” on them at the end of the bayonet. By contrast, the Americans didn’t even need to ask for an alliance—the ex-Warsaw Pact countries were practically begging for it.
Washington’s appeal to current and potential allies is unique and underappreciated. It is our special strength, but it is not guaranteed. Under previous administrations, the question was whether we could sustain that reputation by doing enough to support our friends. Under Trump, the question may be whether we attack them.
Evan Gottesman is chief of staff at the Renew Democracy Initiative.
